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The speed with which concepts are moved to market is a fundamental
issue facing new ventures and their parent corporate sponsors. The questions
that emerge are clear. Is a rapid development cycle from concept to market
vital for successful corporate ventures? What are the pressures induced by
the urgency of product introduction, and how can they lead to poor venture
development decisions? Are there circumstances in which a more deliberate
pace should be recommended in developing a venture? How may they be
recognized beforehand? Conversely, what characteristics of a new venture or
product warrant that speed be the driving priority? Is there a process by
which one can assess a new technological venture that provides insight into
not only the appropriate role of speed in moving a concept to market, but
also, the size and timing of R&D investments, and the constitution of the
new venture team? In other words, how might one establish reasonable
venture development approaches and performance expectations? 1
These questions confront many large corporations that have sought to
diversify through both internal ventures and participating in external ones.
At the first board meeting of 1989 the Directors of a large materials company,
asked the Chairman if in his opinion the results of the company's internal
ventures were being brought to market in a sufficiently timely and
competitive manner. Soon afterward a small group (including the authors)
set out to study a sample of a dozen of the Company's ventures in detail to
address the Board's concern. 2 In the process, we learned some interesting
lessons about structuring and managing ventures that may be applied to
other, large materials based businesses as well.
The Greenhouse
In 1984, the Company initiated the "Greenhouse" as an organization
that identifies, screens, funds, and supports the development of new internal
ventures until the point that they can be transferred to one of the operating
divisions. Since that time, 45 ventures have been funded by the
Greenhouse. These ventures range from railroad cars and batteries, to
microporous membranes for biotechnology applications. Selected ventures,
which pass through a formal screening process involving both technical and
1 The research reported in this paper was an exploratory study of various technical ventures
selected by a large company, and is therefore not necessarily a representative sample of all the
ventures of that firm. A more rigorously designed field study is presently being pursued by the
authors under a grant from the Center for Innovation Studies of Lehigh University.
2 The cases surveyed in this article were investigated and analyzed by Professor Alok
Chakrabarti of the New Jersey Institute of Technology, by Professor Michael Cusumano of the
M.I.T. Sloan School of Management, and by Professor George Farris of Rutgers University, as
well as the authors. We are grateful for their contributions.
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commercial feasibility studies, are assessed to have a strategic fit with the
Company's strengths in core and related technologies.
The Greenhouse strategy may be placed in context of the venturing
activities of other large corporations by considering several key areas:
Product/Technology Scope:
Venturing efforts must always deal with the issue of what product
market areas, as seen in relation to the company's core technologies
and markets, should be supported as ventures. Widely diverse new
business ventures, outside a company's core business areas, have
proven problematic for many corporations. As with most large
corporations, the Company has traditionally given product
extensions its first attention for new business funding. The next
priority in terms of funding lies with the geographic transfer of
products. Then comes new product R&D which can use the
Company's existing channels of distribution. Last, are new strategic
initiatives -- substantially different and new types of applications of
materials technology which offer long-term commercial promise. It
is these projects that have been nurtured within the Greenhouse.
While not all of the ventures have been internally generated, all are
working on new products that are related to the Company's core
technology. Most of the ventures have required substantial product
applications development, and often, what may fairly be considered
as advances provided through basic research.
Organizational Location:
Companies must also deal with the issue of where new ventures
should be situated organizationally, and thus, to whom the venture
management should report. There are several traditional alternatives:
placing a venture rather early on in its development under an
operating division, or keeping the venture with central R&D. The
benefit of the first approach is that the venture receives stronger
market feedback than if it remained, for example, in Corporate R&D.
However, operating divisions often do not have a cultural receptivity
towards new ventures. Further, the venture may lose the closeness
with central research and development needed for continued product
development. On the other hand, the danger with the Corporate
R&D alternative is that product development may more likely occur
within a market vacuum. Worse, such ventures are often under
pressure to validate a particular technology, rather than to develop into
a viable business.
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The "Greenhouse" concept was designed as an intermediate
organizational step between the laboratory and operating divisions,
with the purpose of providing new ventures with more time and
flexibility to grow from seeds into seedlings before they are finally
transplanted fully into operating environments to flourish or to fail.
The guiding notion was to bring more specialized new venture
management processes to business development, and to provide
greater time for more complete product development.
Funding:
The opinions of the key stakeholders in the funding of internal
ventures, the venture founders and the senior management of the
parent corporation often vary in terms of appropriate funding and time
horizons. "Correct" time horizons are clearly dependent on the nature
of both the technology in the new product and the state of the target
market in terms of customer's appreciation or awareness, and the
maturity of distribution channels. Timing is everything. While the
allocation of funds to market research and prototype customer
interaction are clearly worthwhile, large expenditures in sales and
marketing early on for long lead time ventures can be wasteful.
The Greenhouse was designed to achieve appropriate funding through a
multi-level approach: one stage for technology development, and a second
stage for market penetration with completed products. In a materials based
business, the technology development cycle for a new product can produce
lengthy lead-times, far longer, for example, than might be required by a
software company. In the Greenhouse, the successful technological ventures
took between 5 and 7 years to introduce products. Seven years is an average
time required to move ideas to market in typical large integrated businesses. 3
Staffing:
The organizational development of successful technological ventures
typically demands that qualified persons be involved in the areas of
business management and strategy, R&D, and sales. In the context of
internal ventures, companies are often faced with whether to recruit
these individuals from inside or outside.
The Greenhouse was designed to provide appropriate staffing. In fact,
most of the innovative ideas that seed new ventures come from the
Company's laboratories, and the Greenhouse attempts to bring these
3 Glen Urban and John Hauser, Design and Marketing of New Products, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1980.
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inventors into the new ventures. For business management and sales,
experience and customer familiarity are deemed essential, and to get
this, the company has sometimes had to look at outside candidates
familiar with a market which is new to the company.
Operating within the context of a large integrated business, the
Greenhouse strategy has sought to cultivate entrepreneurial attitudes and
endeavors, and to assist new ventures in market planning, staffing, and
financing. Over the past four years, it has screened over two thousand ideas,
about ten percent of which have warranted initial assessment, resulting in
"idea-screening" teams, and less than a quarter of these resulted in actual
funding. In sum, the Greenhouse was designed to screen and refine new
technology ideas, and then to implement those ideas deemed to have high
merit.
Venture Strategies and Risk Management
Going back to the issue of rapidly moving concepts to market, we began
our study with the idea that while faster may be better, speed also brings with
it a series of pressures that, for certain types of technological ventures, can
lead to failed venture development if not clearly understood and managed.
To address the Board's question, we set out to examine a representative
sample of the Company's ventures. All of the cases have grown from the
company's own core technologies, or from purchases, licences and joint-
ventures further developed in its laboratories. Fundamentally, any
purchased technology is required to be closely related to existing core business
or technology strengths. Not all the cases studied are successes or clearly
expected to be successes. As one might expect, the ventures studied originated
in many different ways: some through internal "spin-offs" from either
operating divisions or directly from the company's central R&D organization,
others by acquisitions of companies in promising, related technological fields.
It is of further interest to note that the cases have been largely examples of
"technology-push" situations, where the opportunities seen in new
technologies have led the company into new markets outside of its
traditional businesses. Examples include energy products, separations, and
high performance ceramics. Figure 1 provides a brief description of the
ventures that we examined.
One aspect of our study was to classify the ventures on the well known
dimensions of technical uncertainty and market familiarity, and then look for
key differences in terms of the venture creation and management process.
Earlier research in the role of technological and market applications focus in
new product strategy has shown that the success of new products is in fact
related to the degree of "newness" in technologies and markets. Ventures
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that seek to pioneer new territory for a company in both areas are highly
risky. Furthermore, significant degrees of "market newness" prove more
difficult to conquer than technological newness. "Focused" new product
efforts succeed better than those entailing wide diversity. 4 Consequently, we
believed that assessing the Company's ventures by comparing their diversity
to its core businesses, and observing the key implications of these differences,
would be a productive approach.
Figure 2 shows the ventures grouped according to basic technology and
market categories. For the market dimension, three levels of familiarity or
newness may be identified by asking:
Existing Markets: Does the venture seek to develop products that target
the parent corporation's existing markets in terms of customer groups
and product benefits? Normally, such products can be distributed
through established channels and take advantage of established market
reputation. This can be seen in the second generation of the
Company's pipe ventures shown in Figure 2, where Canadian products
were introduced into the United States.
New, But Established Markets: A venture may also target markets in
which the parent does not currently participate, but in which other
companies do, and thereby seek to introduce substitutes. While the
marketing strategies and distribution channels employed to reach such
markets may be new to the parent, there are clear models that may be
observed in existing suppliers. Thus, while the challenge is great,
there is some degree of certainty in terms of approaches to effective
marketing. As shown in Figure 2, this has occurred with many of the
Company's ventures. PUMPS, for example, has sought to create
ceramic composites for industrial applications, where it is designing
new manufacturing equipment for situations where material wear is a
primary consideration. The FILTERS venture initially made laboratory
filtration equipment.
New, Emerging Markets: At the further extreme, a venture may
indeed seek to break new ground, and in a sense, "create" new markets
for the application of certain technologies. In such cases, competitors
are few, market needs loosely defined, and the need for market
experimentation high. For example, FILTERS has more recently
begun to target novel biomedical applications, such as cell culturing,
with its membrane technology.
4 Marc Meyer and Edward Roberts, "Focusing New Product Strategy for Corporate Growth",
Sloan Management Review, (29:4) Summer 1988, pp. 7-16.
5
Similarly, for the technology dimension, we assessed the Company's
ventures in terms of R&D difficulty and risk as one of three levels:
Incremental Improvement: Where existing parent technology is
incrementally modified to meet new application requirements, a
situation where R&D risks are minimized by the fact that both core
technology and integration requirements are often fairly dear. For
example, RAILCARS was exploiting the Company's expertise in
fabrication and welding processes to make its new generation of
railroad cars.
Major Enhancement: Where substantial modifications are made in the
parent's existing core technologies in order to create the new product.
For example, WRAPPER exploited an idea to effectively use unique
properties of a wrapping material to redirect microwave energy. This
created superior cooking characteristics and differentiated packaging for
frozen foods.
Basic Research: The most challenging and experimental of
technological efforts, ventures of this nature must first create new
basic core technologies before mastering specific product applications.
FILTERS, for example, spent two years in the development of
anodized membrane technologies (for which patents were applied and
received) before delving into specific laboratory and other biomedical
separations applications.
The next step was to see what these differences meant in terms of new
venture management at the Company. We discovered a number of common
characteristics and patterns among the ventures.
Managing Technological Ventures
We considered the Company's experiences with the sampled ventures
in the context of both the conventional wisdom on managing technological
ventures and more recent, popular notions such as "speed". It became clear
to us that the continuous effort to manage new ventures effectively within
the Company has centered a specific set of key approaches. These approaches
are strategies for establishing "speed" objectives, structuring organizational
control, resolving market uncertainty, and managing technology and its
transfer processes, and the expectations of senior executives.
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Setting a Strategy for "Speed"
Speed, as a management priority, can be a wonderful strategy.
Bringing the products of ventures to market rapidly allows a firm to be
experimental, creating an atmosphere which fosters innovation, renewal, and
more importantly, new sources of revenue. And, since few ideas will prove
to be the seeds for consequential businesses, introducing a product quickly to
market is certainly one way to validate market potential.
However, we have observed clearly that shortened business and
technology development times place substantial pressures on a venture team
which may not be desirable from a business perspective in certain classes of
ventures. Market research may perhaps be short-changed. The early testing
and quality assurance for new products may be performed perfunctorily. Or,
the marketing programs and materials required for truly successful market
introduction are not developed fully. All these things can lead to a failed
venture. Thus, executives sponsoring technological ventures must recognize
that speed can indeed have negative consequences.
The Company, like many corporations, has undertaken a number of
new ventures that have entailed large amounts of technological and market
uncertainty. What we have learned is that one must be very careful not to
pressure a venture team into premature product introduction. Throwing
financial resources at the problem may not help either. Reducing the
development cycle for ventures in entirely new areas is likely to increase
expenditures without a corresponding reduction of basic market and product
applications uncertainty. A product can be developed rapidly that no one
wants to use, and an otherwise promising venture can be tarnished due to
senior management's perception of a "failed" first product, an image problem
that can be difficult to overcome.
Thus, effective new product development may not always be the most
rapid product development. "Speed" is relative to the capability of the
venturing company and to the nature of the venture it is attempting. Using
an adaptation of our original framework, Figure 3 shows a contingent
approach to "speed setting". Specifically, new ventures in the lower left
quadrants (small improvement-familiar market) can legitimately be required
to move into the market quickly and to meet financial targets. Both
dimensions of product technologies and user needs are well known, and
hence, speed and effectiveness are compatible objectives, and aligning them
yields success.
Ventures in the center regions of Figure 3 (new applications of a firm's
core technology in markets which though unfamiliar are simply substitutes
for other products or materials) require careful and systematic product and
market development, with much attention placed on prototype
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development, testing and evaluation. Parallel prototype development, while
increasing expense, has the potential to shorten cycle times and accelerate
market penetration. In these types of ventures, effectiveness may not be
equivalent to speed, and thus, speed not necessarily conducive to success.
Lastly, ventures in the upper right quadrant (novel technologies for
unfamiliar markets and latent markets) require a great degree of
experimentation and learning to reduce uncertainty. Development should
proceed slowly, perhaps sequentially, and expenditures should be kept
relatively low. One should seek confirmation of values to users in a variety
of market segments.
This framework also has obvious implications for a company's
financial objectives and performance milestones. For example, the Company
has also learned to adjust its expectations of new ventures based on the degree
of technological and market uncertainty. Small improvements in products
pointed at familiar markets, such as the introduction of drain waste and vent
(DWV) pipe in the United States and Canada have proceeded quickly.
Successive stages of funding can be compared to firm, short-term financial
measures. As soon as the Company attacks a market that is new relative to its
own experience, typically with a substitute, short-term performance objectives
are more difficult to use as the basis for justifying additional investments.
Attempts to enter new markets with novel technology have been the most
difficult, requiring careful development of both technology and market
knowledge. Such ventures have typically entailed joint R&D and marketing
activities with other companies. In this case, funding is for exploratory R&D
and market prototyping, and thus, substantially different than full-scale
business development funding. Spending large sums on highly diverse
ventures should be avoided until market and technological uncertainties
show clear signs of resolution. For the ventures described in this article, the
average time from startup to realized or expected profitability is
approximately six years.
Organizational Control
We have also found that different ventures require different
organizational approaches to achieve success. Less risky ventures require
close ties to operating divisions, energetic use of existing marketing resources
and channels, and numerous ties to customers. Ventures with moderate
degrees of risk require full-scale detailed market studies which identify more
specifically customer needs and distribution methods, as well as energetic
research and development to provide new things to markets you know well.
In those instances where levels of uncertainty are high, full scale planning
and business development may in fact prove counterproductive. Rather, an
executive might want to encourage the venture to develop close ties with a
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few key customers with whom technological applications can be explored.
These relationships must be of sufficient confidence and openness, perhaps
through a joint venture, that the venture's customers are willing to evaluate
sequential prototypes and candidly identify flaws and needed directions for
improvement.
For what types of ventures is the Company's Greenhouse organization
best suited? A possible answer is shown in Figure 3. Ventures approaching
familiar market applications with existing company technology are best
structured as "in-line" efforts, controlled by existing business divisions. On
the other hand, ventures seeking to pioneer new technology solutions for
markets new to the corporation should continue to build their experimental
prototypes under the umbrella of Corporate R&D until such a point where
the understanding of user needs and basic technical solutions have solidified.
For ventures lying between these two ends of the spectrum, ventures with
technical solutions but still needing substantial time and resources to
complete product applications, develop marketing programs, and create
manufacturing capability, it might be argued that neither the operating line
nor R&D are appropriate, but rather, a bridge organization that sponsors
ventures in their migration from R&D to line units. This is the appropriate
role of the Company's Greenhouse. Roberts and Berry5 showed that
approaches to organizing and growing ventures should be selected according
to market and technical familiarity. The development of projects with high
levels of market and technical familiarity should proceed within existing
business units. Those projects that entail new, but familiar markets and
technologies should be approached through internal ventures, acquisitions,
and/or licensing. Projects with the highest levels of unfamiliarity are
candidates for less directly managed venture capital or venture nurturing
arrangements. Our findings are resonant with theirs.
Corporate ventures are dramatically different from independent start
ups. They enjoy both the constraint and the benefit of building on a larger
corporation's core technology. Through ventures the effectiveness of R&D
in the larger context may be enhanced, but this should not lead to the
misconception that speeding projects through R&D automatically means that
time from concept to market will be less or chances of commercial success
greater. By the same token, producing a prototype by no means implies
formal product introduction, particularly in unfamiliar markets.
On a related issue, executives are often concerned about where to find
the best personnel to staff new ventures. It is generally understood that
corporate ventures can be significantly different from independent start up
ventures in terms of organization, culture and politics. There is a natural
5 Edward Roberts and Charles Berry, Entering New Businesses: Selecting Strategies for Success,
Sloan Management Review, (26:3) Spring 1985, pp. 3-17.
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presumption that corporate ventures will recruit internally from the parent
corporation. Our study of the Company experience is that while internal
recruitment often works well for product development, it can lead to serious
problems in the venture's marketing activities. Commodity markets are
dramatically different from niche markets, and especially from seemingly
large and rapidly growing markets such as ceramics or biotechnology, which
are in reality collections of large numbers of highly demanding niches.
Depending on the unfamiliarity and newness of a market a corporate venture
may have no other choice than to work with another firm, perhaps a new
independent venture, or to create a joint venture.
Resolving Market Uncertainty:
Understanding the requirements of unfamiliar markets has been the
greatest challenge facing the Company's ventures. Clearly, if a company has
no business experience in a target market, it needs to implement specific
strategies for validating market acceptability of a new product concept. One
needs to determine if fundamental mistakes are being made early on in
product development. Thereafter, constant market feedback is required. In a
new company, more traditional, structured methods and channels for
gathering market information and customer inputs for product development
are at best tentative. The market feedback is obtained only after first products
are introduced.
While companies are comfortable with the notion of technological
prototyping, it is most often not taken to its logical conclusion: market
prototyping. Functional feasibility, provable in the laboratories, is but a
prerequisite for validating market suitability. Market prototyping, on the
other hand, places an emphasis of getting test products into customers' hands
as soon as possible, and then adjusting design based on their feedback.
For example, in the RAILCARS venture, while prototypes of the new railroad
cars were developed within several years of startup, it took five additional
years of operating these new cars on live tracks to provide the reliability and
maintenance data required to convince customers of the new product's merit.
However, persistence paid off with today's substantial level of sales.
Similarly, in PUMPS, the new composites developed by the venture must
first be prototyped and tested in a wide range of industrial pump components
in order to realize customer sales. It took over three years of wear-testing
experience for PUMPS to have the evidence that its new pump products were
clearly superior.
As one might expect, ventures entailing the application of existing
Company technologies have seen products developed quickly by technical
personnel. The piping ventures, for example, where completed rapidly by the
Company's engineers. When one of the Company's core technologies has
been aimed as a substitute for another company's material, the Company has
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also done well by using its own technical resources, but these products have
taken more years to complete.
On the other hand, when a venture has entailed the development of
technology outside the Company's traditional core technological expertise,
external development resources have been necessary to achieve effective
R&D results. This can be seen in the case of PUMPS, where a new composite
has been developed for industrial pumps. A joint venture was established
with another company that had invented a basic new materials technology in
ceramics. In such cases, our observations have been that technology transfer
between different organizations becomes a primary and often problematic
issue. The Company's experience has been that the exchange of individuals
between companies, in the form of temporary assignments, is the most
effective way to facilitate the transfer of skills and designs.
Managing the Technology and Transfer Processes
Examining technology transfer processes in each of the cases has led us
further to question the conventional wisdom that cautions companies against
delving into ventures which address unfamiliar markets based on new
technology. The critical issue based on the Company's experiences seems not
to be the raw level of uncertainty, but rather putting the appropriate
management practices into place to resolve uncertainties and matching
expectations and time horizons in proportion to those uncertainties.
When uncertainties are low one should clearly put technology
development under the responsibility of a commercial or line manager.
When uncertainty is greater and a new venture created,
technologists should move into the venture, or at the least report
functionally to the venture. Such ventures should be moved through a
greenhouse or bridging organization. In our opinion, the greater the degree
of newness, the more important this is. Even more uncertain cases should be
kept within research and explored until clearer promise justifies greater
levels of expenditure and movement into a venture.
If organizational and transfer mechanisms are not well designed then
pressure for speed to market clearly becomes a detriment. The Company's
experience indicates that effort should be devoted to properly and
thoughtfully organizing first, and only then pressing to move more quickly.
Preparation and care must be taken in advance if one is to succeed with new
ventures. The failure of SHELTER in North America, after considerable
success in Europe and the Middle East, for example, was probably due to an
attempt to transfer technology contractually rather than forming close
working relationships and exchanging people. On the other hand key people
stayed with the RAILCARS venture and were constantly available, giving it a
11
greater chance of weathering substantial delays and early disappointments.
Key people also stayed with PUMPS through many difficulties in prototype
production and testing, and this seems to have contributed importantly to
prospects for success. Looking at yet another pattern, BATTERIES seems a
case of a highly uncertain venture which was made too distant and too
independent early on. It has now been integrated more dosely with the
Company's research efforts, and more frequent movements of people are
ocurring with encouraging results. In summary, the most powerful means of
moving technology is by moving people. The greater the technological
challenge of a new product concept, the more frequent and intimate the
contact provided between sources of technology inside the company or from a
venture partner must be for success.
Setting Expectations and The Role of Top Management
The final overwhelming message of the Company's experience with
internal ventures is that successful ventures require a large measure of
lasting commitment and persistence. The more risky and potentially
rewarding a venture may be, the more necessary it is that top management be
patient and allow sufficient time to pass before the question of payoff should
even be raised. For example, RAILCARS, now seen as an important success,
could easily have been cancelled if evaluated during the long and frustrating
period required for prototype testing. By the same token a larger firm
shouldn't attempt a venture unless it is willing to commit a part of its
resources to the same degree of discounting of present returns for chances at
longer term wealth and growth that independent ventures exhibit.
Commitment must therefore be defined broadly, ie. to be experimental, to
create and sustain valuable businesses, and not be limited to the rapid
introduction of a potentially misdirected new products. Recent successes in
Japan indicate that a period of 10 to 15 years may be more appropriate as an
horizon for producing important new directions in products and markets
than the five year horizons typical in North America.
Commitment to new ventures must therefore be defined broadly, to be
experimental, to create and sustain potentially valuable businesses in their
infancy. Management's support must extend beyond rapid introductions of
product extensions, however valuable these may be, in time as well as
technical and market scope.
In summary therefore, we ask the reader to reconsider the concept of
"speed" in moving new technical ideas into functional products. No doubt,
speed is a hot, fashionable concept. Applied wholesale to any technological
venture, however, speed can produce poor decision-making and ill-fated
products.
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Figure 1
A Description of a Sample of Ventures
Formed in 1985, this is a joint venture to define and
commercialize product applications of a joint venture
company's proprietary technology for creating ceramic parts
that are highly resistant to wear. The partner company's
research had actually started in the mid 1970's. Target
applications have focused on parts for industrial pumps and
'valves, and initial sales were realized in 1988.
BATTERIES
FILTERS
CASTINGS
COATINGS
Having initiated an R&D effort to explore the development
of batteries in 1982, the Company formed BATTERIES in 1985
to commercialize a new battery technology, the ultimate
objective being to help create battery-powered electric
vehicles. By the end of 1986, a few low-ticket consumer
products were developed to gain market experience, and in
1987, BATTERIES began working on more powerful batteries
for use in more demanding applications such as telephone
reserve power.
Incorporated in 1986 with a patent in hand for highly porous
filters, this wholly owned subsidiary has developed a series
of disposable laboratory products. Future products include
biotechnology and manufacturing separations applications.
Development work had actually begun three years earlier in
Company laboratories in Europe, and the total time from
product concept to market was about 5 years.
Based on technology developed at another company, the
Company formed CASTINGS in 1986. CASTINGS
manufactures metal matrix composites based on a simple and
inexpensive casting process which represents a breakthrough
in terms of these materials. CASTINGS promotes the use of
its material by encouraging foundries and extruders to offer
metal matrix components to their customers. The initial
application for this material has been as a substitute for
components where a premium is placed on stiffness and
strength, for example, automotive connecting rods and
tennis racket frames.
COATINGS is a proprietary process for applying reflective
coatings. The major application for this material was for
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PUMPS
highway signs and license plates. The process was developed
in the early 1970's. The Company attempted to
commercialize the process, but this attempt was abandoned
in the mid-seventies, because it was more costly than the
standard method of applying reflective finishes by the use of
reflective tape.
WRAPPER
BRAZING
PIPING
SHELTER
WRAPPER is a packaging system which incorporates metal
arrays in plastic packaging. The arrays are designed to modify
microwave energy to achieve particular features during
microwave reheating of foods such as: even temperature
distribution, browning or crisping (if desired), or selective
heating of the different foods that comprise a complete
dinner. The basic technology was developed by an
independent inventor and enhanced by the Company in
1984. A commercial venture was established by the Company
in 1985. WRAPPER packaging is now in test marketing in
North America, Europe, and Japan.
The Company developed a proprietary brazing process in the
early seventies, which represented a major improvement in
brazing metal heat exchangers. The Company chose to
promote the technology by licensing its use. BRAZING's
technology is rapidly becoming the standard method for
brazing automotive radiators worldwide, and it is being
adopted in many other applications.
The Company developed an unique system for continuously
plowing-in metal gas distribution lines in the sixties. While
there were considerable economic benefits to this system in
comparison with the conventional trenching and laying of
pipe, the early installations suffered from corrosion
problems. In the early eighties these difficulties were
resolved, and the method was widely adopted in Canada. It
was then applied to the plowing-in of oil field gathering
lines. This technology was successfully introduced in the
United States in 1987. In addition a metal drain waste and
vent pipe was developed in Canada, and then introduced in
the United States in 1985.
An Italian company had been marketing a
telecommunications shelter that could protect its contents
from the extremes of temperature and humidity without use
of air conditioning. More than 3000 of their units had been
sold throughout the Middle East and Europe. The Italian
firm approached the Company to be its North American
14
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partner, and a joint venture was set up between the Italians
and the Company in 1988. This venture was called
SHELTER. The venture did not meet expectations, and the
Company withdrew in 1989.
RAILCARS Although the Company participated during the 1960's in the
development of hundreds of railroad cars that offered the
benefits of lighter weight and less corrosion than traditional
cars, manufacturing and fatigue problems kept this
innovation from success. In 1984, the Company started
RAILCARS as a joint venture with a leading railroad car
manufacturer. Over the next several years, RAILCARS
introduced a series of prototype cars to the railroad
companies for extensive testing (300,000 miles of usage per
car). Actual orders for finished products arrived in 1988, four
years after venture startup. Today, sales approximate $100
million.
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Figure 2
Mapping the Technology and Markets
of the Sampled Ventures
The Company's
Technology
Familiarity
The Company's Familiarity with Markets
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Extensions of the New for the New, Emerging
Company's Company, But Market
Current Markets Established Applications
Market Applications
PUMPS
Basic Research BATTERIES
Leading to New FILTERS
Core Technology laboratory separations FILTERS
biomedical
CASTINGS separations
Major DWV PIPING
Enhancements of Canada WRAPPER
Core Technologies
COATINGS SHELTER
BRAZING
Incremental DWV PIPING OIL PIPING
Change in USA Canada
Technology
OIL PIPING RAILCARS
USA
A. 
_
Figure 3
Appropriateness of Different Strategies for
Moving Technology to Markets
A Firm's
Technology
Uncertainty A Firm's Familiarity with Markets
1. The idea should be moved rapidly to market by a line organization.
2. The idea should be developed and implemented by a Greenhouse or
similar intermediary organization.
3. The idea should be carefully developed in R & D.
pushed prematurely to market.
It should not be
4. Ideas in these cells are infrequent and unlikely to be successful.
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Firm's But Established Market
Current Markets Market Applications
Applications
Basic Research
Leading to New 4 2 3
Core Technology
Major
Enhancements of
Core Technologies
Incremental
Change in 1 4
Technology
